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‘Ascertainment by apodeictic proof [burhān]
leads to knowledge [‘ilm]. Intimate
experience of that very state is fruitional
experience [dhawq]. Favorable acceptance of
it is based on hearsay and experience of
others is faith [̄ımān]. These, then, are three
degrees, or levels, of knowledge—“God raises
in degrees those of you who believe and
those to who knowledge is given”.’
- al-Ghazāl̄ı, Deliverance from Error
I am a believer. However, I have never been really swayed by any proof
for the existence of God. While I find them highly interesting merely as an
object of philosophical study, I find all of them to be lacking, and ultimately
philosophically bankrupt. Indeed, there is a vast philosophical literature that
has drawn out the pitfalls of all these arguments.
But I am a philosopher. So why, then, would a believing philosopher still
be committed to the existence of God, when he has not been swayed by
any rational arguments for the existence of God? In this paper, I want to
briefly explain (in a casual manner) why one would come to belief (or rather
knowledge) of God without rational proof. My thesis is this : the best way
for knowing God is not through proofs, but through spiritual cultivation and
hopefully the acquisition of experiential knowledge (please note that I will
not explain how this can be done).
Here, I take my cue from al-Ghazāl̄ı. To some, this might seem odd, as in
another paper I raised some serious criticisms about al-Ghazāl̄ı, and raised
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even the possibility that he might not be a Muslim. But to be clear, those were
theoretical and historical questions that were raised for a dialectical purpose,
and ultimately the religious status of al-Ghazāl̄ı is besides the matter. There
are many other philosophers, religious thinkers, and mystics who have raised
similar considerations, and I am only jumpstarting the conversation with
al-Ghazāl̄ı as I am most familiar with his work in this area.
While al-Ghazāl̄ı is sympathetic to philosophical inquiries into the nature
of God, ultimately, al-Ghazāl̄ı thinks that knowledge of God needs to be
in some sense experiential—what he calls “tasting” or dhawq—in order for
one to acquire true and certain knowledge [al-‘ilm al-yaq̄ın] of the existence
of God. And this seems to be right. If God, under the classic monotheistic
descriptions exist, then he should be an object of experience. Indeed, it would
be unfair for human beings (allegedly created by God) to never have an
intimate experiential relationship with him, but then be judged and either
sent to heaven or hell on the Day of Resurrection based on their failure
to intellectually comprehend complex philosophical proofs (burhān) for the
existence of God.
But what exactly is the argument here? One might think the argument
runs as follows:
1. If God exists, then God is an object of experience.
2. God is an object of experience.
evidence for (2): a subject, S, has an experience of God.
∴ God exists.
Obviously, however, I would not make that argument as it commits the formal
fallacy of affirming the consequent. More importantly, experiences can either
be successful or unsuccessful : just because S has an experience of God, that
in no way entails that God exists. Of course, al-Ghazāl̄ı is committed to
premise (2). But the argument has to be more complicated.
As shown in our epigraph, for al-Ghazāl̄ı, dhawq is an epistemic notion.
When he claims that dhawq is experiential he does not mean merely experi-
ential, rather he has in mind what we would now call knowledge by acquain-
tance, that is, the kind of knowledge a subject achieves through direct causal
interaction with an object, an epistemic awareness with an object that is
immediate and achieved without any inference by the intellect (‘aql). Unlike
‘experience’, ‘knowledge’ is a success-term: knowing implies getting something
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right about the world. And in classic mystical and philosophical systems like
al-Ghazāl̄ı’s, one can read ontological claims off (the right kind) of epistemic
claims. Thus if a subject, S, has knowledge that x, S can conclude that x
exists.
Thus, the argument probably runs as follows:
1. God exists if and only if some subset of subjects have direct acquain-
tance (dhawq) of God.
2. Some subset of subjects do have direct acquaintance (dhawq) of God.
∴ God exists.
Logically speaking, this argument is valid.1 However, it is wholly unclear
how one can establish its soundness. While one may concede premise (1), it is
unclear how one can verify premise (2). But that is actually al-Ghazāl̄ı’s very
claim, and arguably, the whole point of Sufism. Indeed, we find al-Ghazāl̄ı
claiming throughout the Deliverance from Error that there is no way for the
subject of dhawq to convince another subject that they had such an epistemic
experience. In fact, al-Ghazāl̄ı claims that such epistemic experiences cannot
even be linguistically described, and that the true Sufi Sage must remain
silent. Thus, the only subject that will be convinced of the conclusion will be
the subject who can self-verify premise (2).
Al-Ghazāl̄ı’s real intellectual and spiritual task, then, is to layout a method
for another subject to self-verify premise (2). And that will not come about
through his writing further arguments and explanations concerning the na-
ture of God. Rather, it will have to concern laying out spiritual practices
that, if the subject engages in and cultivates in the right kind of way, will
lead her to dhawq.
As I claimed at the outset, I am not going to rehearse or explain in any
detail the spiritual practices in question (the how part of attaining dhawq).
Instead, I want to finish off by explaining (in general) the theoretical under-
pinnings for spiritual practices. For many (both inside and outside of religious
and spiritual traditions), the impetus for spiritual practices and rituals might
be the fulfillment of some divine command, religious law or sacrament, etc.
While al-Ghazāl̄ı will not deny that there are certain spiritual practices that
1The biconditional for premise (1) might be too strong, but I will leave it like that for
now.
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must be performed by the practicing Muslim, the ultimate reason why they
ought to be formed is not merely because it is an act of worship required by
some divinely revealed law. Rather, each spiritual practice has a teleologi-
cal function, and when these spiritual practices are coordinated together in
the right kind of way, they work in concert to achieve one overall aim. That
overall aim, of course, is knowledge of God. At least confining ourselves to
the Islamic tradition, that is indeed the purpose of spiritual practices for the
human being: achieving knowledge of God.
But how exactly are spiritual practices supposed to help subjects achieve
this epistemic end? Here, I want to raise some general considerations in favor
of spiritual practices. However, I am in a tricky bind: recall al-Ghazāl̄ı’s claim
that fruitional experiences of God cannot be described. Thus, I somehow have
to motivate to the reader the importance of cultivating spiritual practices for
the end of achieving an experience that I cannot describe. A philosophical
problem indeed.
The idea behind spiritual practices is this: the mind, the soul, or the heart
(whatever you want to call it) is a tool that must be sharpened, cleaned, and
purified before it can see things as they exactly are. One must cultivate the
soul with the right kinds of practices in order to undergo the right kinds of
experiences. The general notion that we must work on ourselves in order to
have certain experiences is a familiar one, and should not be far-fetched. In
sports, for example, athletes undergo a variety of drills, practices, and mental
tricks so that they can undergo certain experiences on the court or field. In
basketball, for example, athletes undergo a variety of drills so that they can
achieve a unique kind of perceptual experience on the court, namely, court
vision. Court vision obtains when (say) a point-guard can see and anticipate
a certain play or movement of players occurring before it even happens. A
good point-guard has cultivated their mind and body so that they can deliver
a no-look pass, or intuitively move to a certain side of the court to create an
open-shot for another player, and so forth.
Now, one may object as follows: I can understand that the point-guard has
such perceptual capacities because I see them performing at such a high-level
on the basketball court, and can understand that their complex drills and
practices can create those abilities. However, I cannot see how that obtains
for the Sufi Sage. This raises an interesting question: what is the evidence or
external signs of dhawq? While al-Ghazāl̄ı would certainly say that there are
certain abilities of the Sufi Sage that cannot be discerned by external agents,
the real external sign of dhawq is excellent character. That is, the Sufi Sage
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conducts themselves in a way that is unparalleled to none in terms of their
mercy, kindness, generosity, courage, temperance, wisdom, and patience. This
is a kind of consistent excellent character that can only emanate from a
special kind of knowledge. And when it comes to speaking of God, the Sufi
Sage is more often silent than engaging in discursive lectures.
Our objector may now raise a new objection: I have not seen these Sufi
Sages at all. And here, I unfortunately agree: historical records abound in
Islamic history of Sufi Sages with this kind of character. But the Sufi Sage
is, arguably, becoming extinct (if not entirely extinct). The reason why Su-
fism is not appealing to the masses anymore, is because there simply aren’t
many people living Sufism anymore. Of course, there are many people who
invoke Rumi, al-Ghazāl̄ı, and Gı̄lān̄ı, but these seem to be mere invocations
of beautiful works. Few people actually inculcate these works into their lives.
And that raises a real epistemological and skeptical problem for us now.
How can one be motivated to achieve dhawq in the absence of such moral
exemplars and teachers? That is a question that I would like to leave for
another day. But with all the texts and records available, I will just say this:
pursuing the Sufi path of engaging spiritual practices is, of course, a gamble.
But is it not a gamble worth sincerely making?
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